Mercer Law Review
Volume 2

Number 2

Article 9

5-1951

Case Notes
William Wisse
James B. O'Connor
Jack Senter
M. Clarence Streetman
Clifton J. Dillman Jr.

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr

Recommended Citation
Wisse, William; O'Connor, James B.; Senter, Jack; Streetman, M. Clarence; Dillman, Clifton J. Jr.;
Fitzsimmons, Sanford M.; Rogers, David R.; and Robbins, John M. (1951) "Case Notes," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 2: No. 2, Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol2/iss2/9

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Case Notes
Authors
William Wisse, James B. O'Connor, Jack Senter, M. Clarence Streetman, Clifton J. Dillman Jr., Sanford M.
Fitzsimmons, David R. Rogers, and John M. Robbins

This casenote is available in Mercer Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol2/iss2/9

CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-EMBEZZLEMENT-LEGAL INTEREST IN
CITY NECESSARY TO CONVICT OFFICER
Defendant, chief of police, accepted deposit of money in lieu of bail,
under color of his office, without statutory authority, from persons
charged with violations of municipal ordinances. The defendant was
convicted under a statute which provides that any municipal officer
who shall embezzle any money from the city shall be punished by
imprisonment. GA. CODE § 26-2801 (1933). This conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. Held: Reversed. Conviction cannot be sustained, as the
city had acquired no title or interest in such money. Scarboro v.
State, 207 Ga. 449, 62 S.E.2d 168 (1950).
To obtain a conviction for embezzlement, it is necessary to show
that the property was within statutory protection, that the accused
acquired it lawfully, and converted it with a fraudulent intent. United
States v. Harper,33 Fed. 471 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1887). If the officer has
no right to the possession or control of public money, as such officer, the
fact that he acted under color or pretense of his office would not give
him a greater right. State v. Bolin, 110 Mo. 209, 19 S.W. 650 (1892). In
the absence of a statute conferring such right, a magistrate or officer
has no authority to accept a cash bail or a deposit of money in lieu
of bail. Callaway v. Town of Belleville, 116 N.J.L. 377, 184 Atl. 819
(1936). Embezzlement is a species of larceny, and in prosecutions
for either offense, ownership of the property alleged to have been
taken is a necessary averment. McKee v. State, 200 Ga. 563, 37 S.E.2d
700 (1946). Any legal interest in goods, although less than absolute
title, will support an allegation of ownership. Sharp v.State, 61 Neb.
187, 85 N.W. 38 (1901). But there must be an actual legal interest,
not a mere claim or expectation of interest. Phillips v. State, 42 S.W.
557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897). To obtain a conviction of embezzlement
by an agent, it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused was the agent charged with receiving money or property on
behalf of his principal. Kramer v. State, 16 Ala. App. 456, 78 So.
719 (1918). Thus, sums of money received from prospective purchasers of county warrants, which were to satisfy vouchers for labor
performed, were held not to be public funds, within the meaning of the
embezzlement statutes. Wright v. People, 104 Colo. 335, 91 P.2d 499
(1939). And surplus fees paid to clerk of Federal Court, over and
above the compensation and allowances which he is authorized to
retain, have been held to be neither "public moneys" or "moneys or
property of the United States" within the embezzlement statutes.
United States v. Mason, 218 U.S. 517, 31 S.Ct. 28, 54 L. Ed. 1133
(1910).
To sustain a conviction the money embezzled must be public money.
Drake v. State, 53 Ariz. 93, 85 P.2d 984 (1939) ; State v. Horne, 62
Utah 376, 299 Pac. 378 (1923) ; State v. Gordon, 146 Kan. 41, 68 P.2d
635 (1937). "Public moneys" are all moneys which shall come into
(432)

CASE NOTES
the hands of any officer of any municipal or public corporation pursuant to any provision of law. Youngstown v. Youngstown Municipal
Ry. Co., 134 Ohio St. 308, 16 N.E.2d 541 (1938). And it has been held
that money collected by a public officer without authority is not public
money subject to embezzlement by such officer. Mason v. Cook, 187 Ky.
260, 218 S.W. 740 (1940). The officer is not estopped to assert his want
of authority. Sherrich v. State, 167 Ind. 345, 19 N.E. 193 (1906).
Some courts have held that one who has received money under color
of authority is guilty of converting it to his own use, although he
acted without authority in receiving the property. State v. Luckie,
43 Idaho 580, 283 Pac. 618 (1930).
In the principal case the evidence failed to show that the city
had any title or interest in the money alleged to have been embezzled
by the accused which was necessary to obtain a conviction. Many cases
appear to be contra to the principal case, but on close examination it
will be found that the officer or agent so convicted did embezzle funds
which were public property. In Cooper v. State, 101 Ga. 783, 29 S.E.
22 (1897), the clerk of the County Commissioners of Fulton County
was convicted of embezzlement as he could, at least in some instances,
lawfully receive money belonging to the county. The principal case
follows the rule of strict construction of criminal statutes, causing
the result to seem undesirable at first sight. The state is not powerless in such case, however, as it is believed that a conviction could be
sustained under GA. CODE § 89-9909 (1933), which provides that extortion shall consist of the unlawful taking, by a public officer under
color of his office, of any money or thing of value that is not due him,
or more than is due.
WILLIAM WISSE.

CRIMINAL LAW-WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS
AFTER IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE
Accused and another were charged with simple larceny. At a hearing in the judge's office, they were informed of the charge against
them. An attorney who had been appointed by the court asked the
defendants if they wanted to plead guilty. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, the attorney signed the plea in their presence. After the
court entered sentence and judgment, the defendants made a motion to
withdraw the pleas of guilty, alledging among other things that they
did not intend to enter a plea of guilty, that they were uneducated
and did not understand the consequences of entering the plea and did
not realize what was occurring at the time the plea was entered, and
that they did not know the attorney who entered the plea and had no
conversation with him concerning the case. The trial court overruled
the motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction. Held: Affirmed. The
withdrawal of a plea of guilty after sentence has been imposed is
not a matter of right, but is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that
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the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion. Boyett
v. State, 81 Ga. App. 49, 57 S.E.2d 831 (1950).
This note is not concerned with the withdrawal of a plea of guilty
befor sentence has been imposed, as that question is settled in Georgia
by statute. GA. CODE § 27-1404 (1933). After judgment has been imposed on a plea of guilty, it is yet not too late to withdraw such plea in a
proper case. Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 615, 77 S.E. 1080 (1913). In
such case, the withdrawal is not a matter of right, but is a matter addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial judge, whose judgment
will not be controlled in absence of manifest abuse. Farley v. State,
12 Ga. App. 151, 97 S.E. 870 (1918). The failure of the court to exercise this discretion in favor of withdrawal is an abuse of discretion
where there is any valid and sufficient reason why defendant should
be permitted to withdraw such plea to prevent injustice. Bearden v.
State, 13 Ga. App. 264, 79 S.E. 79 (1913).
What circumstances warrant appellate courts in finding an abuse
of discretion where a person attempts to withdraw his plea of guilty
after the trial court has imposed sentence must be determined in
the light of decided cases. It was held to be an abuse of discretion
to refuse to allow defendant to withdraw his plea where the uncontradicted evidence showed that defendant entered his plea under a
misapprehension as to the offense, and that he believed he was pleading guilty to another offense. Farley v. State, supra. Similarly, the
motion to withdraw should have been granted where the accused
pleaded guilty to one indictment believing he was pleading guilty to
another indictment which was pending against him. Davis v. State,
20 Ga. 674 (1856). The mental and physical condition of the accused
often present extenuating circumstances, where it is not possible
for him to comprehend the full significance of entering a plea of
guilty because of ignorance or imposition. Strickland v. State, 199
Ga. 792, 35 S.E.2d 463 (1945) (accused was boy of 17 charged with
murder) ; Rowland v. State, 72 Ga. App. 793, 35 S.E.2d 372 (1945)
(accused was an epileptic who had reposed confidence in sheriff).
The most baffling questions are presented when the accused enters
his plea of guilty upon representations and assurances by court
officers or other persons that he will be dealt with leniently by the
court. Where the officers deny that they made any assurances or
promises to the accused, the discretion of the trial judge will not be
upset. Smith v. State, 27 Ga. App. 270, 108 S.E. 121 (1921) ; Jackson
v. State, 99 Ga. 209, 25 S.E. 177 (1896). In a leading case, it was
held that where the solicitors assured counsel for the accused that,
in their opinion, a misdemeanor punishment consisting of a fine would
be imposed, and accused relied on this assurance, it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial judge to refuse to allow defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty after a felony sentence of five years in the
penitentiary was imposed. Griffin v. State, supra. Frequently, the
courts approach the question from a negative standpoint, refusing to
overrule the trial judge's discretion because it does not appear that
a court official misled or induced the accused to plead guilty or made
any promise with respect thereto. Foster v. State, 22 Ga. App. 109,
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95 S.E. 529 (1918) ; Sears v. State, 45 Ga. App. 344, 164 S.E. 458
(1932) ; cf. Welch. v. State, 63 Ga. App. 277, 280, 11 S.E.2d 42, 44
(1940). Where the accused himself provoked a discussion about the
"best way out," it was not error to refuse the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea although a sheriff and deputy sheriff indicated to accused that, in their opinion, he would get off light but that the judge
could impose the maximum fine. Smith v. State, 64 Ga. App. 312, 13
S.E.2d 96 (1941). Despite some broad language in Rowland v. State,
supra, and Stricklavd v. State, snpra, concerning representations and
promises by sheriffs, it does not seem that an accused is justified in
relying on arresting and detention officers as he' would be in the case
of solicitors or judges, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
Smith v. State, 64 Ga. App. 312, 13 S.E.2d 96 (1941).
Obviously, no set rules can be deduced from the cases. The courts
attempt to balance several conflicting principles. "It is sufficient if
the plea is entered under a misapprehension or a mistake, or if the
defendant is led to believe, by anyone upon whom he has a right to rely,
that he would benefit by entering the plea rather than by submitting
his case to a jury." Rowland v. State, supra. "A plea of guilty ought
never be received, unless it is freely and voluntarily made; and if
the prisoner is misled, or is induced to enter his plea by fraud, or
even by mistake, he ought to be allowed to withdraw the plea. The
law favors a trial on the merits." Strickland v. State, supra. But
where the accused fully appreciates the possible consequences of entering a plea of guilty, he should not be permitted to withdraw it
later. " . . . Otherwise, a prisoner would be permitted to speculate
upon his punishment, and, if severer than he anticipated, withdraw
his plea and take the chances of an accquittal." Griffin v. State, supra.
JAMES

B.

O'CONNOR.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-SEPARATION AGREEMENTSRIGHT OF. WIFE TO HAVE IT SET ASIDE
BY A COURT OF EQUITY
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a separation agreement which
provided that $30.00 per week would be given the plaintiff and her
daughter for support. At the time the agreement was entered into,
the husband represented his income as being $4,000.00 per year; the
wife's health was poor and her destitute financial status at that time
forced her to accept'the terms of the agreement. The wife alleges
that the agreement was entered into improvidently and unadvisedly
and seeks to have it set aside on the grounds that its provision for
support is inadequate. Since that time the defendant's financial condition has been bettered to such an extent that he is now able adequately to support the plaintiff and her daughter. The wife sued to
set aside the separation agreement. The defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of
action was granted, and the plaintiff appeals. Held: Reversed. The
allegations of the complaint stated a cause of action by asserting that
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the agreement was unfair, inadequate and that the wife entered into it
improvidently and while in a state of bad health and that the measure
of support was not fair, adequate and equitable. Pomerance v. Pomerance, 301 N.Y. 254, 93 N.E.2d 832 (1950).
At common law any contract between husband and wife without
the intervention of a trustee was void, because in the contemplation
of law they were considered as one person. Winter v. Winter, 191 N.Y.
462, 84 N.E. 382, 16 L.R.A.(NS) 710 (1908). Even under the common law doctrines of unity of husband and wife, courts of equity
for many purposes treated them as distinct persons capable of contracting with each other and would enforce such contracts if they
were fair, just and reasonable. Barron v. Barren, 24 Vt. 372 (1852).
After the passage of the married woman's act which gave the wife
freedom to contract with her husband without the intervention of
trustee and gave her remedies at law on such contracts, it did not
affect equity's jurisdiction to relieve the wife from the effect of an
unfair contract with her husband. Hungerford v. Hungerford, 161
N.Y. 550, 56 N.E. 117 (1900). Because of the close relationship between husband and wife, contracts between them will be closely
scrutinized by a court of equity to see that the wife has not been
coerced or overreached. Summer v. Summer, 121 Ga. 1, 48 S.E. 727
(1904). Ordinarily the court looks favorably upon settlements made
outside of court and if the financial adjustment between husband
and wife are satisfactory to them and the provision for support is
adequate for maintaining the wife in view of the husband's circumstances, the court will enforce the agreement. Winter v. Winter,
supra. In entering into the agreement, the husband must exercise
the utmost good faith and make a full and fair disclosure of all material facts. Cessna v. Cessna, 155 Kan. 856, 130 P.2d 560 (1942). A
provision for support which is inadequate, coupled with certain surrounding circumstances, may give rise to an inference of fraud, and
the burden is upon the husband to establish proof that the agreement
was fair and equitable. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 157 Ga. 60, 121
S.E. 639 (1923). To determine the fairness and reasonableness of the
agreement, all the circumstances such as wealth of husband, existing
means of the wife, the age of the parties and the wife's full and clear
knowledge and understanding of the nature and meaning of the terms
of the contract are properly regarded. Tilton v. Tilton, 130 Ky. 281,
113 S.W. 134 (1908). Separation agreements which contain provisions
relieving the husband from the duty to support are contrary to public policy and void. Leeds v. Leeds, 265 App. Div. 189, 38 N.Y.S.2d
515 (1st Dept. 1942). Courts as a general rule have enforced covenants
and promises in separation agreements relating to maintenance of the
wife provided they are fair and equitable, are reasonable in their
terms and are hot the result of fraud or coercion and the separation
has actually taken place when the agreement was entered into or
follows immediately. Kirkland v. Kirkland, 236 Ala. 120, 181 So. 96
(1938).
All courts agree that where the husband and wife enter into a
separation agreement which is fair, free from fraud and voluntarily
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entered into by the wife and which provides adequate support for
the wife, it will not be set aside solely on the grounds that it is inadequate in accordance with the husband's present means. Crowell v.
Crowell, 135 Misc. 530, 238 N.Y. Supp. 44 (S.Ct.1924). If, however,
at the time the agreement was entered into, the husband was not
financially able adequately to support his wife, because of bad financial
condition, and he subsequently becomes financially able to do so there
is a different question presented. Under present Domestic Relation
Laws the husband cannot absolve himself from the complete duty of
supporting his wife by means of a separation agreement. When the
husband marries he assumes the obligation of supporting his wife
and by law she is entitled to that support. She is not confined to his
circumstances at the time the contract was entered into. Tirrell v.
Tirrell, 232 N.Y. 224, 133 N.E. 569 (1921). When they enter into an
agreement voluntarily, openly, and free from any deception, the
courts will not set aside the agreement unless it is plainly inadequate.
Goldman v. Goldmav, 282 N.Y. 301, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940). In such
case "inadequacy" means that the wife must prove that unless the
court requires the husband to increase payments under the agreement
she will become a public charge or that she is already one. Sinno v.
Sinno, 174 Misc. 869, 21 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1940). If the
provision for support is inadequate under the separation agreement
because of the husband's difficult circumstances and his financial condition materially improves, the court upon the wife's petition will
compel him to support her adequately and will order an increase in
payments. Smith v. Smith, 39 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1943). The
public has an interest in the matter, because a failure of the husband
to support her will cause an undue burden on the public. His obligation to support is a continuing one so long as the marital status
exists. Harding v. Harding, 203 App. Div. 721, 197 N.Y. Supp. 78
(4th Dept. 1922).
The instant case appears to be the better view. It is quite evident
that the court must enforce more severe rules when dealing with the
matter of contracts between the husband and wife, because both
parties do not stand on the same level when contracting. All courts
seem to be in accord that the contract between these parties must
be fair in every sense of the word, and if there is any fraud or other
unfair practices such contracts can be set aside by the court. When
the wife enters into a contract with her husband voluntarily and
with a clear knowledge of the surrounding facts, the courts are
rather reluctant to set aside such contracts and will do so only
when public policy demands it. For this reason, when the husband
attempts to contract away his duty to support his wife by means of
a separation agreement, the courts deem that such is contrary to
public policy, and will order the husband to provide for his wife. It
must be kept in mind at all times that three parties have an interest in every marriage, the husband, the wife, and the public, and
anything which results from the marriage which is prejudicial to
either can be adequately dealt with by a court of equity.
JACK SENTER.

MERCER LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES-REMOVAL-R-IGHT
NOTICE OF REASONS

IVol. I I
TO

Plaintiffs were summarily removed from their civil service positions by the Secretary of the Army by authority granted in an Act
of Congress. 56 STAT. 1053, 5 U.S.C.A. § 652 (1942), note. This act
expressly exempts employees of the Army and Navy Departments and
the Coast Guard from provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollete Act governing civil service. 37 STAT. 555, 5 U.S.C.A. § 652 (1912). It permits
summary removal of employees of these departments where demands
of national security warrant such action, but provides that persons
so removed shall have an opportunity to appear before a representative of the secretary concerned within thirty days and be fully informed of the reasons for such removal. Within thirty days after the
hearing, the employee may submit statements or affidavits to show
why he should be retained. The Secretary concerned has discretionary
power to reinstate employees discharged under the statute, and to
compensate them for loss of pay. Letters of removal to plaintiffs
contained only general allegations as to activities in the Communist
Party and related organizations, but at subsequent hearings before
the Army Security Review Board, the employees were questioned as
to names, places, and dates concerning their activities, and were
cross-examined by their own counsel. Neither plaintiff requested the
opportunity to submit any further data. Plaintiffs sued for mandatory injunction requiring the Secretary of Army to furnish necessary
additional information and to grant hearings at which they might
defend themselves. District Court dismissed complaint and plaintiffs
appealed. Held: Reversed. Letters of removal and subsequent appearances of plaintiffs before Review Board for questioning did not
comply with statute requiring that they be fully informed of reasons
for dismissal. Deak v. Pace, Jr., Secretary of Army; Patton v. Same,
185 F.2d 997 (C.A. D.C. 1950).
The power of an executive officer to hire employees carries with
it the right to remove them, although this power may be restricted
by Congress. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.
Ed. 160 (1926) ; Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 292 U.S.
602, 55 S.Ct. 869, 42 L. Ed. 1611 (1935). Generally, the courts have
been content to leave the operation of the executive branch to executive officers, particularly in the matter of removing employees. If
procedural requirements are observed in the removals, the court has
no power to review the decision of the executive agency on the merits
of the case, even if the court deems the decision to be erroneous.
Asher v. Forrestal, 71 F. Supp. 470 (D.C. 1947). For more than one
hundred years, the judiciary has recognized that "the interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the
executive departments of the government would be productive of
nothing but mischief." Decatur v. Pauling, 14 Pet. 497, 10 L. Ed. 559
(U.S. 1840) ; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869,
84 L. Ed. 1108 (1940). The right of an employee in classified civil
service to be removed only for reasons given to him in writing (Act
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of 1912, supra) does not require that a person in that position shall
be granted a hearing before removal. Culligan v. United States, 107
Ct. Cl. 222 (1947). An employee of the federal government can be
removed under a War Service Regulation where the Civil Service
Commission holds a reasonable doubt as to the employee's loyalty.
Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Under an
act similar to the one involved in the principal case (54 STAT. 676,
50 U.S.C.A. APPENDIX 1942), it was held that the Secretary of Navy's
action in dismissing an employee "in consideration of a report received from the Civil Service Commission . . . for administrative reasons" was authorized, where the employee got no further information
and made no request for hearing and information. Weinstein v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 554 (Ct. Cl. 1947). The rights of an employee under the acts governing federal employment are limited by
the statutes, and "do not involve constitutional rights of a defendant
charged with crime." Money r. Wallin, 84 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa.
1950).
Judge Prettyman's dissenting opinion in the'principal case is based
largely on Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (C.A. D.C. 1950, cert.
granted, 339 U.S. 977, 70 S.Ct. 1025; afl'd, April 30, 1951; see
Macon Telegraph, May 1, 1951, p. 1, col. 4), decided by this same
court a few months earlier. In that case, the court held that the Secretary's action in dismissing an employee for alleged disloyal activities without giving him any information as to names, dates, or places
was authorzed by Executive Order 9835, which requires charges to be
stated as specifically and completely as "in the discretion of the
employing department or agency, security considerations permit."
Judge Prettyman quotes a portion of the record of the hearings which
plaintiffs in the principal case had before the Army Security Review
Board. They were asked questions concerning at least eight persons,
two meetings, and two or three specified places. It is not in the record
that the Secretary of Army possessed any additional information on
the activities of the plaintiffs. Neither of the plaintiffs requested an
opportunity to present further data, although there is nothing on
record to indicate that they were denied the privilege of presenting
defensive information within the specified thirty-day period. In view
of these facts, and the Secretary's authority to reinstate, in his discretion, such employees with compensation for loss of pay, it is not
difficult to understand Judge Prettyman's agreement with the trial
judge that plaintiffs were not entitled to the mandatory injunction
requiring the Secretary to furnish "additional information," or that
they were removed by procedure other than that set out in the statute.
M.

CLARENCE STREETMAN.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-CIVIL RIGHTSPROFESSIONAL MAN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE CLIENTS
Plaintiff, a Negress, brought this action against Defendant, a
dentist, for failure to treat her because of her race. Plaintiff pros-
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ecuted this action under a statute which seeks to prohibit denial of
accommodations to persons because of their race or color. Statutory
provisions declare certain undertakings to be public and forbid denial
of accommodations by employee, keeper or manager because of race
cr color. OHIO ANN. CODE § 12940 (1930). Defendant's occupation is

not set forth in the statute as being one in which discrimination is
prohibited. The phrase "or other place of public accommodation" is
included after specific citations within the statute. Plaintiff maintained that the aforementioned phrase embraced the Defendant's
occupation. Held: Defendant's demurrer to the complaint sustained;
the general words "other place of public accommodation" do not encompass a dentist's office. Rice v. Rivaldo, 95 N.E.2d 30 (Ohio 1950).
The courts have been reluctant to adopt a statutory construction
which will change the common law unless the legislative intent to do
so is clear, and have, with but few exceptions, strictly construed the
Civil Rights statutes by applying the rule of ejusdem generis, mindful that they are primarily penal in nature. Kvehn v. Faulkner, 136
Wash. 671, 241 Pac. 290 (1925). Application of this canon of construction to Civil Rights statutes has resulted in decisions that many
types of businesses are not places of public accommodation when the
intent of the legislature has not been expressed by specific inclusion
of them by name within the statute. Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77
N.W. 31 (1898) (saloons) ; Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 95 Mass.
247 (1866) (billiard rooms) ; Brown v. Meyer Sanitary Milk Co.,
150 Kan. 931, 96 P.2d 651 (1941) (ice cream parlors) ; Cecil v. Green,
161 Ill. 265, 43 N.E. 1105 (1896) (soda fountains) ; Indcpendence v,.
Richardson, 117 Kan. 656, 232 Pac. 1044 (1925) (boarding houses);
Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 46 Misc. 617, 92 N.Y. Supp. 851 (App.
Div. 1905) (apartment buildings) ; State v. Brown, 112 Kan. 814,
212 Pac. 663 (1923) (restaurants) ; Faidkver v. Solazzi, 79 Conn.
541, 65 Atl. 947 (1907) (barber shops). The Ohio court recently refused to construe the statute involved in the principal case to include
a ladies' retail clothing store in the phrase "or other place of public
accommodation." Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E.2d 410
(1936). However penal statutes, cloaked with a remedial intention,
have not been the subjects of strict construction in every case. Recently the United States Supreme Court held that phonograph records,
although not expressly included in a statute seeking to ban obscene
material from Interstate Commerce, were included within the general phrase "or other matter of indecent character," reasoning that
to hold otherwise would defeat the purpose for which the legislation
was enacted. United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 70 S.Ct. 352, 94
L. Ed. 457 (1950). A contrary approach was used by a New York
court in construing a Civil Rights statute. The court expressed the
view that the legislature by naming specific types of establishments
and failing to include others intended to confine the operative effect
of the statute within narrower borders than the plaintiff contended.
The court said, however, that this approach is not to be used if it is
clear that such a construction will destroy the purpose of the statute.
Gibbs v. Arras, 222 N.Y. 332, 118 N.E. 857 (1918). This view is also
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advanced in a later case in which a beauty shop located in a department store was considered not to be a place of public accommodatioi,
the court stating that certain places not specifically named in the
statute do not fall within its operative effects. As the court pointed
out, the numerous amendments including more types of businesses
within the statute as being public, give rise to the assumption that
they are the only types of business which the legislature sought to
render liable in damages for practicing discrimination. Campbell v.
Eichert, 155 Misc. 164, 278 N.Y. Supp. 946 (App. Div. 1st Dep't. 1935).
Courts in reaching decisions which involved Civil Rights statutes
have expressed views which tend to show that they consider the statutes
as not having been designed to accomplish a change in relationship
between professional men and those who seek their services. The
physician-patient relationship is a consensual one in which the patient
knowingly seeks the assistance of the physician and the physician
knowingly accepts him. Butterworth v. Swhit, 53 Ga. App. 602, 186
S.E. 772 (1936). In the absence of statutory provision, a physician
is not bound to render services to everyone who applies, and he is not
liable for damages allegedly resulting from his refusal to take a case.
This is not altered by the fact that a license is required to practice
medicine. Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901);
Butterworth v. Swint, supra. One jurisdiction holds that offices of
professional men are private in nature and not places of public accommodation, since each person who is accepted as a patient or client
is treated apart from others in the privacy of an office contrary to the
procedure usually followed in places of public accommodation such
as restaurants, inns, public conveyances, etc. Cantrell v. State, 8 Ga.
App. 725, 70 S.E. 96 (1911) ; Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 213, 60 S.E.
1082 (1908).
The principal case seems to be one of first instance, hence there
are no decisions reported which are directly in point with it. However, judging from the dictum expressed in several opinions it is
apparent that the courts have the opinion that professional men may
still choose to serve according to the dictates of their own conscience
and are responsible to no one unless a contract has been entered into.
Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 210 Pac. 374 (1922). If the above deduction is a correct one, the consideration of it along with other
similar ones leads to the conclusion that the principal case is decided
correctly and is grounded in sound judicial reasoning. At a time when
the Negro is eager to know his rights it would seem wise for legislatures enacting Civil Rights statutes to draft them worthy of clear
interpretation and void of seemingly meaningless generalities. Until
such time as this is done it will be necessary for courts to continue
including within their opinions this oft repeated phrase, "remedy of
plaintiff and all others who are unfortunately in her position and
claim to have similar grievances lies with the legislature through an
amendment to this statute."
CLIFTON J. DILLMAN, JR.
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TAXATION-CORRECTION OF ASSESSMENTS OF STATE
INCOME TAX
Defendant company was sued by the State of Maryland for an additional assessment on its income tax returns for the years 1941 to
1947, inclusive. The applicable statute provides substantially that as
soon as practicable after each return is received, the Comptroller shall
examine same, and if a greater amount of income tax is found to be
due it shall be assessed by the Comptroller "within three years from
the date the return was originally due or filed"; that the taxpayer
may appeal to the Tax Commission within thirty days after said notice; that the determination of the Tax Commissioner shall be prima
facie evidence of the amount of tax due; and that the taxpayer may
appeal from the findings of the Tax Commission as provided by law
for said appeals. MARYLAND CODE Art. 81, § 247. Defendant admitted
the increased assessment for the years 1945 to 1947, inclusive, and
paid the same, but contended that the provisions "within three years
from the date the return was originally due or filed" is a condition
precedent, and as that time had elapsed the Comptroller has no authority in law to revise a return duly filed with that officer. The trial
court sustained the State's motion for a summary judgment. On
appeal, Held: Affirmed. Where taxpayer did not appear before the
Comptroller in order to make known to that officer its reasons why
the increased assessment should not be made, and took no appeal
whatever from the action of the Comptroller, such action was final
and taxpayer could not collaterally attack the assessment in an action
by the state for collection of the tax. Ainerican Bank Stationery Co.
v. State, 75 A.2d 86 (Md. 1950).
The states are reasonably consistent in providing a statutory limitation period, similar to that of the Maryland Code section, beyond
which state taxing agencies may not go in reassessing additional income tax. State ex rel. Globe Steel Tube Co. v. Lyons, 183 Wis. 107,
197 N.W. 578 (1924) ; Thomas v. State, 3 W.W. Harr. 601, 141 Atl.
64 (Del. 1928) ; Tax Collector v. Dickey, 192 Ga. 382, 15 S.E.2d 445
(1941) ; Joy Floral Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 29 F.2d 865 (D.C.
Cir. 1928). The statutory limitations are not statutes of limitation
which wipe out the obligation of the income owner to pay his income
tax, but are limitations on the taxing agencies' power to go back and
reassess beyond the limitation period. State ex rel. Globe Steel Tube
Co. v. Lyons, supra. It cannot be held that there is an intention to
permit the taxpayer to ignore the tribunal especially established for
the purpose of enabling him to have a correction of equities. Traverse
'Beach Ass'n v. Elnwood, 142 Mich. 297, 105 N.W. 768 (1905); Holbrook v. County Treasurer, 56 S.D. 54, 227 N.W. 461 (1929). Ordinarily, the taxpayer must resort to the remedies before an administrative body where so provided, otherwise, he cannot be heard to assert its findings invalid, and he must do so at the times and in the
manner prescribed by the proper statute and regulations. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. Powell, 217 N.C. 495, 8 S.E.2d 619 (1940).
A distinction should be made, however, between the instances where
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a taxing agency makes an erroneous assessment within its powers,
and those where the taxing agency goes beyond its powers in making
an illegal or void assessment. There is substantial authority that the
statutory limitations operate to bar additional assessments on income
tax returns. Kelly v. Tax Commission, 203 Wis. 639, 234 N.W. 701
(1931). In the instance of an illegal and void assessment the taxpayer may not be precluded from bringing suit to recover taxes paid
under protest. National Metal Edge Box Co. v. Readsboro, 94 Vt. 405,
111 Atl. 386 (1920). Where an assessment is illegal and wholly void
there is no necessity to appeal to the Board of Equalization to correct the assessment. Holbrook v. County Treasurer, supra. The statutory remedy is exclusive, except where the assessment is illegal and
void. South Broadway National Bank v. Derver, 51 F.2d 703 (10th Cir.
1931). Taxpayer may attack collaterally assessments which are void.
Curd v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 457, 227 S.W.2d. 1003 (1950). Where
the assessment is void, it may be impeached in any way and at any
time, for it is no judgment in law. Boyce v. Tax Collector, 97 Vt. 473,
124 Atl. 853 (1924). In Georgia the taxpayer may dispute the collection
of the additional assessment found to be due by the State Revenue
Commissioner, by filing an "Affadivit of illegality." This is the exclusive remedy for contesting illegal collection of income tax. State
Revenue Comin'r v. Edgar Bros. Co., 60 Ga. App. 482, 4 S.E.2d 71
(1939). A failure to protest does not preclude the taxpayer from recovering taxes erroneously paid. Baltimore v. Home Credit Co., 165
Md. 57, 166 Atl. 604, sustained on rehearing 165 Md. 57, 167 Atl. 552
(1933).
The Maryland decisions pertaining to interpretation of income tax
statutes are decidedly in the minority, The Maryland court in Wasena
Housing Corporationv. Levay, 188 Md. 383, 52 A.2d 903 (1947), extensively reviewed the decisions in that state pertaining to the issue,
and arrived at the conclusion that the statutory remedy was exclusive,
even to cases where the additional assessment was void ab initio. The
court based its decision on a construction of the word "erroneous,"
defining it to be "broad enough to cover all types of error, even those
that may invalidate an assessment or render it void-this is not only
the plain meaning of the word, but such construction would appear
to carry out the legislative policy to make the remedy by way of
appeal exclusive in this type of case." Apparently, that is the only
construction which can be placed on the word "erroneous" in order
to bring the decisions into compatibility with the income tax code
section. Such distended definition of the word "erroneous" is untenable. A voidable assessment would be within the scope of the Maryland
decisions; but it is a fallacious construction of "erroneous" to extend
its definition to include "void." In Comm'r v. Service Lines, Inc., 291
Ky. 410, 164 S.W.2d 593 (1942), the court said opinions which hold
the statutory remedy of appeal to be exclusive are illusory because of
the apparent failure to distinguish between "void" and "voidable,"
applying them as though synonymous. The case being noted is a distinctive example of the applicability of the two words. Those cases
cited as supporting the decision in this case embrace situations where
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the Comptroller made the additional assessments, allegedly erroneous,
but within his power to make. In those cases the Comptroller's findings
are only voidable, and the taxpayer should be held to the statutory
remedy of appeal. In the case being noted, however, the Comptroller
exceeded his power in going beyond the statutory limitation period
to levy an additional assessment on returns which had been duly filed.
Therefore, this additional assessment is void. The weight of authority
decidedly holds that where, as in this case, the taxing agency exceeds
its authority in making a void assessment, the taxpayer is not precluded from attacking collaterally an attempted collection of such
assessment.
SANFORD

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-CUSTOM
OF CARE

M.

FITZSIMMONS.

AS A STANDARD

Plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries sustained when a
bottle from which she was pouring milk broke in her hand. Defendant
dairy had bottled the milk and delivered it to a grocer, where plaintiff
purchased it a few hours later. Defendant showed that its inspection
of bottles was similar to that used generally in the dairy industry,
but there was undisputed testimony to the effect that such an inspection was not sufficient to have revealed a flaw in the bottle which
caused it to break. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by Appellate
Division, and plaintiff brought this appeal. Held: Affirmed. A dairy
company which follows customary procedure in inspecting and filling
its bottles is not liable to a customer who is injured when one of its
bottles falls apart, in the absence of substantial proof of negligence
on the part of the dairy, and a causal relation to consumer's injury.
Dissent: If the defendant negligently failed to take adequate precautions to eliminate reasonably foreseeable hazards, it is no answer that
other bottlers were likewise negligent. Smolen v. Grandview Dairy,
Inc., 301 N.Y. 265, 93 N.E.2d 839 (1950).
The question of how great a part custom should play in setting up
a standard of conduct for professions and industries has been a source
of considerable uncertainty and confusion. Many jurisdictions follow
the statement of Justice Holmes that "what usually is done may be
evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed
by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it is usually complied
with or not." Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 23 S.Ct.
622, 47 L. Ed. 905 (1903). On the other hand, the ordinary usages of
a business or industry have been set up as the sole criterion in determining negligence in methods. Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R. Co.,
136 Pa. 618, 20 Atl. 517 (1890). It has also been held that the observance of a custom gives rise to an inference that due care has been
taken, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Ketterer v. Armour
& Co., 247 Fed. 921, L.R.A. 1918D 798 (2d Cir. 1917). A number of
secondary authorities, however, are in accord with Justice Holmes
that custom is not a conclusive test of due care. PROSSER, TORTS § 37,

1951]

CASE NOTES

p. 241 (1941); 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE, § 10, p. 20
(REV. ED. 1941) ; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 461, p. 489 (3rd. ED. 1940).
The test of due care is not custom or usage, but what reasonable prudence would require under the circumstances. Dungan v. Appalachian
Power Co., 33 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1929); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Behymer, supra. However, evidence showing the custom in a business,
and the observance of'such a custom, is admissible in setting up a
standard of care under the circumstances in a particular case. Shannahan v. Empire Eng. Corp., 204 N.Y. 543, 98 N.E. 9 (1912) ; Denning Warehouse Co. v. Widener, 172 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1949). This
evidence may be supplemented by expert advice to show why choice
of a course of action may cause a foreseeable risk of injury to others.
Levine v. Russell Blaine Co., 273 N.Y. 386, 7 N.E.2d 673 (1937).
Although the majority in the principal case implies that the following of customary procedure would not be a valid defense against substantial proof of negligence, it fails to make clear what constitutes
"substantial proof." It semes to be well settled that absolute, positive
proof of negligence in a tort action is not required by law, and that
circumstantial evidence establishes a legal presumption of negligence,
shifting the burden to the defendant to controvert it. Rost v. Kee &
Chappell Dairy Co., 216 Ill. App. 497 (1920) ; Hepp v. Quickel Auto
& Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525, 25 P.2d 197 (1933) ; D'Amico v. Conquista,
28 Wash.2d 300, 183 P.2d 181 (1946); see also 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 41 (3rd ED. 1940.) This rule is followed particularly when plaintiff
rules out the possibility that the injury could have reasonably resulted
from causes other than defendant's negligence. Dunn v. Hoffman
Bererage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A.2d 352 (1941) ; Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wash.2d 802, 180 P.2d 564 (1947).
Undisputed facts in the principal case indicate that there was no
negligence in the handling of the milk bottle after it left defendant's
possession. The majority opinions in this case, both here and in the
Appellate Division below, seem to be based on the theory that if a
dairy company has followed the custom of that business, it has complied with the requirements of due care. And in both decisions the
dissenting justices contended that the customary way of doing a thing
may be a negligent way. It is difficult to agree with the majority,
particularly in view of another case decided in the same jurisdiction a
year before. There, the New York courts affirmed a judgment for a
plaintiff who was injured by an exploding bottle of beer, on the
grounds that the defendant brewery failed to use due care in inspecting its bottles before filling them, and consequently used a defective
bottle. Saglimbeni v. West End Brewing Co., 298 N.Y. 875, 84 N.E.2d
638 (1949). The principal case is distinguished in the opinion from the
Saglinubevi case because of the tendency of beer to build up pressure,
while milk normally does not. But it seems that if a defendant in one
case is liable when it bottles its product in a defective container which
would have been detected by a reasonable inspection, the same reasoning should apply in the other.
M.

CLARENCE STREETMAN.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYEE
COLLECTS TWICE FOR SAME INJURY
Claimant contracted silicosis in the second stage during the term
of his employment. Under a compromise settlement he received $1,000.00 from his employer and gave him a release from future liability.
The term of employment continued. Later, the employer elected to
come under the Workmen's Compensation Act and immediately claimant filed for compensation for silicosis in the second stage and was
awarded $1,600.00 by the State Compensation Commissioner. This
award was reversed by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.
On appeal, Held: Reversed; order of the State Compensation Commissioner reinstated. An employer who elects to become a subscriber
to the Workmen's Compensation Fund, while continuing a subscriber,
is bound by all the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
relating to obligations arising thereunder. Vernon v. State Compensation Comm'r, 61 S.E.2d 243 (W.Va. 1950).
Briefly, workmen's compensation acts impose liability upon the employer to make compensation for disability or death of the employee
resulting from' accidental personal injury arising out of and in the
course of the employment, without regard to fault as a cause except
where the injury is occasioned by the employee's wilful intention to
produce it; it graduates the compensation for disability according to
a prescribed scale based upon the loss of earning power; and measures
the death benefits according to the dependency of the surviving wife,
husband, or infant child. New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S.
188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667 (1917) ; Mountain Timber Co. v.
State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685 (1917).
Under such acts liability is not based on negligence. Enterprise Dairy
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 202 Cal. 247, 259 Pac. 1099
(1927). The theory involved is the protection of the employee against
the risks of the employment. Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S.
400, 39 S.Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058, 6 A.L.R. 1537 (1919). Therefore, in
view of the social desirability of workmen's compensation acts, the
tendency has been for courts to give them very liberal interpretations
in order to bring a particular case within the scope of the act. Penker
Construction Co. v. Cardillo, 118 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (employee
assaulted and killed by fellow employee) ; Caswell's Case, 305 Mass.
500, 26 N.E.2d 785 (1941)
(employee injured when a hurricane
destroyed a building) ; Cram v. Byron G. Moon Co., 285 N.Y. 42, 32
N.E.2d 785 (1941) (employee fell and was injured while enroute to
lunch) ; Beaver v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 55 Idaho 275, 41 P.2d 605,
97 A.L.R. 1399 (1934) (employee developed tuberculosis) ; Enterprise
Dairy Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 202 Cal. 247, 259 Pac.
1099 (1927) (employee injured by broken bottles when an earthquake
caused the brick wall of an adjoining building to fall through the
roof of the shed).
Workmen's compensation acts may be either elective in that the employer has the option to come under its provisions, or compulsory in
that it is mandatory for certain employers. Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243
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U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L. Ed. 678 (1917); New York Central R.
Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667 (1917). The
great majority of the acts provide -by their own terms that no employer or employee shall exempt himself from the burden or waive
the benefits of the act by any contract, agreement, rule or regulation.
Brigham Young University v. Industrial Conmmission, 74 Utah 349,
279 Pac. 889, 65 A.L.R. 152 (1929). In the absence of such terms the
courts usually prevent contractual limitations from being imposed on
the operation of the act on grounds that contracts to this effect are
against public policy, thereby protecting the employee from possible
coercion or intimidation. International Coal and Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Il. 524, 127 N.E. 703, 10 A.L.R. 1010 (1920).
Therefore a contract of settlement between employee and employer,
whereby the former waives any benefit under the act is void. Brigham
Young University v. Industrial Commission, supra. Such interpretation has been applied only to contracts of settlement which were
effected after the employer had become a subscriber to the fund and
was clearly bound by the provisions of the act. Walker r. State Compensation Comm'r, 107 W.Va. 531, 149 S.E. 604 (1929).
The holding in the instant case is based upon the premise that after
the employer became a subscriber to the compensation fund he was
bound by all the provisions of the act, entitled to its benefits and subjected to its burdens. Proceeding on this premise the court affirmed
an award permitting an employee to recover twice from the same
employer for the same injury, disregarding entirely the recognized
policy of the law which forbids more than one complete satisfaction
for the same injury. McDonough v. National Hospital Association,
134 Or. 451, 294 Pac. 351 (1930) ; Berkley v. Wilson, 87 Md. 219, 39
Atl. 502 (1898) ; Cleveland v. City of Bangor, 87 Me. 259, 32 Atl. 892
(1895). The court acknowledged that its holding was based upon prior
cases where the contract of settlement had been signed after the employer elected to come under the act. Accordingly, the court permitted
the act to operate retroactively upon an executed contract which had
already terminated prior to the employer's election to come under the
act. Furthermore, the court disregarded entirely the leading case of
New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, supra, which upheld the constitutionality of the New York Workmen's Compensation Act. In that case
the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Pitney, said, "Perhaps we should add that it (the act) has no retroactive effect."
DAVID R. ROGERS.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURIES SUSTAINED
IN GOING TO AND FROM WORK
Plaintiff was injured returning from his place of employment. Due
to claimant's physical condition an essential part of the employment
contract was that transportation both to and from his place of employment would be furnished by his employer. The employee, while
arriving at his own direction, and paying his own bus fares, was
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driven home each evening by the direction of the defendant, by one
of the company drivers. Occasionally such transportation was unavailable and the defendant knew of and consented to the plaintiff's
returning home by bus. The plaintiff, having been directed by the
defendant to take a bus home, in the absence of other transportation,
was walking from his place of employment to the bus stop when he
was struck on a public way and suffered the injuries for which this
action was commenced. Trial court awarded compensation. On appeal,
Held: Affirmed. Injuries received by plaintiff arose out of and in the
course of employment. Katz v. Katz, 75 A.2d 57 (Conn. 1950).
Except in a very minor number of states still following old commonlaw doctrines, the compelling inquiry in determining whether a particular accident arose out of and in the course of employment is the
relation of the accident to the employee's service agreement, including
time and place, when considering Workmen's Compensation litigation.
Jett v. Turner, 215 Ala. 252, 110 So. 702 (1926). While the general
rule that an injury suffered by an employee while going to or coming
from the employers' premises where the work is carried on does not
arise out of his employment so as to entitle him to compensation, there
are exceptions. If an employer furnishes transportation for his employee as an incident of the employment, or as a part of the contract
of employment, an injury suffered by the employee while going to
or from his place of employment in the vehicle furnished by the employer and under his control arises out of and in the course of his
employment, and will be compensable. Phifer's Dependents v. Foremost Dairy, Inc. 200 N.C. 65, 156 S.E. 147 (1930). To have employees'
injury arise in course of employment it must appear that that injury
occurred within the period of employment, at place where employee
could reasonably be, and at a time when he was reasonably fulfilling
his duties of employment, or something incidental thereto. The receiving of wages at time of injury is not the controlling factor in
determination of this question. Waters v. Service Oil Co., 132 Conn.
388, 44 A.2d 709 (1945). Acquiescence, at the least, is required on
the employers' part, to establish his liability in injuries arising from
transportation to and from place of employment. As this quiet permission grows, so does the case for liability, reaching an absolute certainty when the transportation becomes a part of the employment
contract, and as such, is a part of the consideration for that employment. Hamner v. White, 80 Ga. App. 648, 56 S.E.2d 653 (1949). A
much different situation presents itself when evidence discloses employees to be acting voluntarily, and not under the control of the employer. Taylor v. Gulf Refining Co., 11 La. App. 270, 122 So. 162
(1929). The injury must be the result of some risk of the employment.
Ranklin v. Girvin, 231 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. App. 1950). Even in the absence of direct control, the employer may be accountable for injuries
to his employee. London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Herndon, 81
Ga. App. 178, 58 S.E.2d 510 (1950).
The courts apparently weigh the factors involved in each Workmen's
Compensation case involving transportation of the employees to and
from their homes, using the "out of and in the course of employ-
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ment" doctrine. It will be noted that these factors are inseparable
and must be concurrent. The factors considered by the courts in determining this include time and place wages begin, what part the
transportation plays in the employment contract, the degree of control
the employer has over the employee at the time of injury, and by
whose direction the transpoytation was utilized. Taylor v. Gulf Refining Co., supra. Actual ownership of the vehicle involved in the
accident is not a controlling factor in itself, but lends credence to the
idea that the employer is sponsoring this mode of transportation.
Hamner v. White, supra. From a comparison of the cases from this
jurisdiction it appears that had the instant case arisen in Georgia
the courts would have arrived at the same conclusion as those of
Connecticut. London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Herndon, supro;
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25
S.E.2d 74 (1943); Travelers Insu.rance Co. v. Bailey, 76 Ga. App.
698, 47 S.E.2d 103 (1948) ; Note, 2 MERCER L. REV. 285 (1950). Georgia, as it becomes more and more industrialized, is becoming more
aware of the Workmens Compensation Act and the spirit with which
it was enacted. To do the most good for the working man, for whom
it was drafted, it must be liberally interpreted. It would appear that
Georgia is doing just that.
JOHN M. ROBBINS.

